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Microsoft is ending Entra ID SMS codes: prepare to switch

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Microsoft is retiring its own SMS and voice authentication in Entra ID from February 2027. Learn how login code phishing works and how to prepare.

Microsoft is again urging Entra ID administrators to move employees to phishing-resistant sign-in methods, such as passkeys. This follows its decision to retire Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication. The retirement begins on 1 February 2027. Organisations that do not switch in time risk leaving employees unable to complete sign-in.

The news article, published on 28 October 2026, concerns Entra ID environments for employees. Microsoft identifies phishing and SIM swapping as risks of phone-based authentication. An extra sign-in code helps protect against someone using a stolen password alone. But a scammer can also try to obtain that code.

What Microsoft is changing in Entra ID

Entra ID manages access to business accounts and applications within organisations. When employees sign in, they may need to complete an extra check alongside their password. This is called multifactor authentication: signing in with more than a password alone.

For some organisations, Microsoft provides that extra check through a text message or an automated phone call. It will begin retiring this service on 1 February 2027. Administrators need to have another supported method in place before the rollout begins.

The change specifically affects authentication in Entra ID environments for employees. The announced retirement does not apply to Azure AD B2C or customer identities in Microsoft Entra External ID.

Microsoft recommends passkeys. These are digital sign-in keys that let employees sign in without typing an SMS code. The article also mentions FIDO2 security keys, which are physical devices used for secure sign-in. Other supported methods include QR code authentication. Whether a method resists phishing depends on how it works technically. Not every replacement for SMS automatically offers the same protection.

Organisations that need to keep phone-based authentication can configure their own telecom provider through the Microsoft Security Store. The change does not mean that every form of SMS or voice authentication will become unavailable. Microsoft is ending its own delivery of these services for this use.

According to the article, Microsoft announced in July that passkeys would start rolling out as the default sign-in experience from September. As the rollout reaches an organisation, users with SMS or voice authentication will also be enabled for passkeys. At their next multifactor authentication prompt, they will be asked to register a passkey. Administrators therefore need to prepare both the technical migration and the guidance for employees.

How phishing with an SMS code works

An SMS code feels familiar. You have your phone with you. The message appears after a sign-in attempt, and the code is only valid for a short time. Yet having that code does not prove you are signing in on the right website.

The following explains how an attack might work. It describes the technique, not a specific incident from the news article.

A message takes you to a fake sign-in page

An attack might start with a message directing you to what appears to be a business sign-in page. The reason fits your work. You need to open a document or update your account settings.

The page looks like the screen you normally use. You enter your work username and password. The attacker receives those details or passes them straight to the genuine sign-in service.

The genuine service then asks for the extra check. As a result, a genuine text message containing a genuine code arrives on your phone. The attacker does not need to fake that message.

The attacker gets you to complete the check

The fake page asks for the code you have just received. You type it in because the process looks just like a normal sign-in. The attacker uses the code immediately to continue.

In a more advanced version, an intermediary website sits between you and the genuine service. It relays the sign-in steps. If the attack succeeds, the attacker may also be able to take over the authenticated session. This is the access that remains open after you sign in.

The employee's actions are understandable. The code arrives during a process they started themselves. The deception lies in the website where they enter it.

A phone number can also be taken over

Microsoft also mentions SIM swapping. This involves an attacker trying to get a victim's phone number activated on a different SIM card. If successful, messages or calls may reach the attacker instead.

A passkey works differently from an SMS code. The sign-in key is tied to the genuine service. A fake website cannot use that key in the same way to complete the intended sign-in. This makes passkeys resistant to this form of sign-in phishing. It does not remove every other risk to the account.

What this means for small and medium-sized businesses

For a small or medium-sized business, this affects both account security and business continuity. A stolen account can expose business information. A poorly prepared migration can leave employees locked out.

What an attacker can do depends on the permissions attached to the compromised account. Access to a mailbox can let someone read business conversations and impersonate an employee. That could make a later attempt at payment fraud more convincing.

Even without a direct financial loss, recovery takes working time. The organisation needs to establish what access was misused. It then needs to secure accounts and check whether others received suspicious messages. If business contacts have been approached, trust may also suffer.

The planned retirement brings a separate risk. An employee who has only set up SMS or voice authentication may become stuck at the extra sign-in check. Work could be delayed while an administrator tries to restore access.

Simply making a new method available is not enough. Employees must also be able to use it on the devices they work with. Consider a shared workstation or a situation where someone does not have their usual phone.

Organisations with an external IT provider need clear agreements. Establish who will review the current settings. Agree who will support employees who still need to switch, and who will help if the new sign-in method fails. Record those responsibilities before the old option disappears.

How to recognise phishing involving sign-ins and passkeys

A genuine change to the sign-in process can raise questions. A scammer could exploit this with a fake migration request. This is a possible approach, not an attack described in the supplied news article.

Watch for these signs in messages about account security:

  • The web address does not match your usual sign-in route. Check the full address. A familiar name somewhere in it does not make the website trustworthy.
  • A message unexpectedly sends you to a sign-in screen. Open the application using your own bookmark or your usual work environment. Check there whether the same action is required.
  • Someone asks you to share a sign-in code. A code belongs to your own sign-in attempt. Do not read it out to a caller or send it in a chat.
  • You receive a code when you are not trying to sign in. Someone may be attempting to sign in with your details. Report it through your agreed internal channel.
  • You are asked to register a new sign-in method. First check that the instruction genuinely comes from your organisation. An unauthorised method added to your account could give an attacker access.
  • The message uses the move to passkeys to put pressure on you. A genuine deadline does not make the sender genuine. Check the request with your own IT contact.
  • A familiar logo is used to reassure you. Branding is easy to copy. Focus on where you have landed and what you are being asked to do.

A message without spelling mistakes can still be phishing. Equally, a genuine registration process may appear unexpectedly. Explain to employees in advance what they can expect during the migration.

What employees and organisations can do now

Treat the migration as a managed change. Combine the technical setup with clear instructions for employees.

For employees

  1. Open your work environment through your usual route. If you receive an unexpected migration message, do not use its link to change your account.
  2. Check registration requests with your IT contact. Call a number you already have or use your established internal reporting channel.
  3. Set up the agreed sign-in method. Follow the instructions your organisation has provided through its trusted channel.
  4. Test your normal work afterwards. Check that the new method gives you access to the applications you need.
  5. Report it immediately if you enter a code on a suspicious website. Explain what you entered and when. Do not wait for visible signs of misuse.

For administrators and organisations

  1. Identify who uses SMS or voice authentication. The article mentions the Entra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner PowerShell script for this purpose. Microsoft lists the Authentication Policy Administrator, Global Reader and Security Reader roles.
  2. Choose a suitable replacement. Prefer phishing-resistant authentication where possible. Check that the chosen solution suits employees' devices and ways of working.
  3. Test the migration with a small group. Include less typical workstation setups. Resolve problems before rolling out the change more widely.
  4. Explain the registration process in advance. Tell employees which channel will carry the instructions and where they can get help. Make clear that they do not need to share codes with anyone.
  5. Set up a recovery procedure. Decide how employees can safely regain access if they lose their device or security key. Verify their identity as part of that process.
  6. Check that registration is complete. Do not just check whether passkeys are available. Confirm that employees actually have a working replacement method.
  7. Review necessary exceptions. If phone-based authentication must remain, investigate the option of using your own telecom provider. Account for the phishing risks that will remain.
  8. Document what happens after a phishing report. Have the administrator investigate suspicious access and end active sessions where necessary. Changing a password alone may not be enough if a session has already been taken over.

How Lumyo Awareness helps

With Lumyo Awareness, we recreate these kinds of deceptive sign-in requests in phishing simulations. Employees practise recognising a suspicious sign-in route or an unexpected registration request. Awareness training teaches them how to check a request and what to report if they have already entered their details.